Reducing People?s Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Communities and Resilience by Cannon, Terry
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2008 
* School of Humanities and Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, London, email: 
t.g.cannon@gre.ac.uk; terrycannon@blueyonder.co.uk 
This is a revised version of a paper originally prepared for the UNU-WIDER conference on Fragile 
States–Fragile Groups, directed by Mark McGillivray and Wim Naudé. The conference was jointly 
organized by UNU-WIDER and UN-DESA, with a financial contribution from the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the contributions to its project on Fragility and Development 
from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, and the UK Department for International Development—DFID. Programme contributions are 
also received from the governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—
Sida). 
ISSN 1810-2611   ISBN 978-92-9230-080-7 
Research Paper No. 2008/34 
 
Reducing People’s Vulnerability 
to Natural Hazards  
 






The concepts vulnerability, resilience and community are widely used and abused in the 
literature on natural hazards and disaster risk reduction. This paper seeks to bring 
greater rigour in their use. In particular, vulnerability must be understood as a set of 
socioeconomic conditions that are identifiable in relation to particular hazard risks, and 
therefore perform a predictive role that can assist in risk reduction. Resilience is often 
confused as a concept, sometimes seen as the inverse of vulnerability, and by others as 
an independent quality. These confusions may be especially relevant in the context of 
§policy for disaster risk reduction at the scale of community. Here there is often an 
idealized notion of community as undifferentiated and unproblematic. 
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Vulnerability (to natural hazards) should be understood in the context of the individual 
and household as being composed of five (interacting) components: livelihood, base-
line status, self-protection, social protection, and governance. The paper highlights the 
key problems associated with disconnections between these that result in rising 
vulnerability. In particular, it examines vulnerability in the context of the current 
expansion of interest in community based disaster preparedness (or management). For 
this to be effective, a clear analysis is essential of the relations between disaster 
preparedness and governance, especially the way that power operates at the community 
level. The ways in which community can operate to support, undermine or be irrelevant 
to disaster preparedness are analysed. It concludes by suggesting the conditions that are 




Looking at the enormous literature on disasters, and the documents of innumerable 
conferences and workshops, several keywords keep coming up: vulnerability, resilience, 
and community. Yet there seems to be a great deal of confusion about what they mean 
and their significance in disaster preparedness. To make vulnerability meaningful, we 
need to have a much deeper understanding of it, to be able to use it in analysis, 
preparedness and with the power of prediction—not of the hazard but of the people 
exposed to risk. Then there is community, a w o rd  th a t al w ay s seem s to  b e u s ed  to  
convey such a positive attitude that we might wonder if there is anything that 
‘community’ cannot do! Communities are regarded as if they have qualities that 
somehow make them immune to the conflicts and antagonisms that permeate the rest of 
society. And yet as we shall see, despite the rather exaggerated expectations of them, 
working with communities (whatever that means) does seem essential for disaster 
preparedness.  
Resilience is tricky too. It is noticeable how it is hardly ever used before a disaster. 
Afterwards outsiders find that people—often in a community—have apparently 
demonstrated their coping strategies and resilience. Of course they have been resilient: 
that is why they are still there. But there may be many more that perished, the coping 
process may have been appallingly awful, and resilience may mean bouncing back to a 
situation that is much worse than before the disaster. For it to be useful, we need to 
know whether people can cope or be resilient before a disaster happens. There is the 
danger that outsiders, impressed by the mere fact of survival, romanticize the virtues of 
resilience. The task surely is not to marvel at this, but to create the conditions that make 
coping unnecessary and resilience much more than a return to vulnerability. 
This paper tries to unpick the meaning of these words so that we can use them in a more 
useful way. We can start with vulnerability, a word that is often confused with poverty, 
deprivation, marginalization and other connotations of victimhood. Vulnerability is also 
often ‘discovered’ after the event, as in typical disaster reportage that finds that ‘most of 
the victims were from vulnerable groups’. This fails to recognize that for the concept to 
be at all useful, it must be predictive. To begin to make this work, we need to move 
away from a concept of vulnerability involving passivity and suffering, to one that 
shows the causes and can point the way to how it can be reduced. This means increasing 
capacities as well, and therefore fostering and enabling people’s resilience.  
The idea that people have capacities (or capabilities) and not just vulnerabilities has 
received increasing recognition in the past fifteen years, especially after the book Rising 
from the Ashes (Anderson and Woodrow 1989/1998) was published. This gave a voice 
to the more positive side of people in disasters, and developed the framework of 
capacity and vulnerability analysis (CVA).1 The idea is that people should not be 
perceived as helpless victims, but as agents with the ability to cope and demonstrate 
resilience with their own resources. For instance, it is widely known that the greatest 
share of emergency response and rescue in most disasters is carried out by the local 
                                                 
1   There is a review of the CVA approach, together with other methods of assessing vulnerability, in 
Cannon, Twigg and Rowell (2003). 2 
people themselves, demonstrating that they have important capacities and are not simply 
vulnerable and waiting passively for outside help.2 
The plan of this paper is first to examine what vulnerability means—to get some deeper 
sense of its components and causes. This is then linked up with resilience to show that 
for each aspect of vulnerability, people and sometimes communities have positive 
qualities that can counter their vulnerabilities. By breaking vulnerability down into its 
components, we can realize that it is not uniform or all-encompassing. We can then 
examine the relationship of both vulnerability and resilience with the idea of 
community, so that we understand whether community is a valid way of understanding 
the social context of disasters, and what it can and cannot be expected to do in disaster 
preparedness. 
2  What does vulnerability mean? 
Vulnerability has become one of those slippery terms (like ‘sustainability’) that is now 
used to signify so many different things that it is in danger of losing any real meaning. It 
is often used in a very vague way to indicate that there are problems for people who are 
‘vulnerable’, but without making much specific reference to the causes. Often it is even 
used without reference to any particular hazard or risk—people are simply described as 
vulnerable because they appear to be living in difficult circumstances, or have already 
been badly affected by a hazard. We need to understand that vulnerability has a number 
of components that must be understood separately. 
3  Vulnerability and its components 
It now seems widely accepted that ‘natural’ disasters are not in themselves natural: a 
disaster only happens when a hazard has an impact on a vulnerable population.3 What is 
needed is a precise definition that enables us to identify in advance those who may 
suffer from the impact of a particular hazard. First we can examine the components of 
vulnerability to understand what causes some people to be more at risk of a hazard than 
others. We can then analyse the interconnections of vulnerability with resilience. Can 
vulnerability be reduced by building up capacities that foster resilience and enable 
‘positive’ rather than ‘distress’ coping?  
Vulnerability can be defined in terms of five components that capture all aspects of the 
exposure to risk from natural hazards (see Figure 1):  
i)  Livelihood strength and resilience  
ii)  Wellbeing and base-line status 
                                                 
2   But as we shall see below, it would be wrong to idealize this emergency response as signifying 
community cohesion. It is difficult in many cases to find an equivalent willingness to engage in 
collaborative preparedness and mitigation activities, and in many cases as local communities recover 
they reproduce similar patterns of differential vulnerability to those of the pre-disaster period. 
3   For an elaboration of this argument, see for instance Wisner et al. (2004), especially chapters 1 and 2. 3 
iii)  Self-protection 
iv)  Social protection, and  
v)  Governance.  
These five are interrelated, and the linkages between them are especially important in 
understanding the causes of vulnerability and the design of policies to reduce it. The 
most important links are those that affect livelihood strength and social protection, both 
of which are largely dependent on governance to determine how effective they are.  
The basic building block in determining a person’s vulnerable is how satisfactory their 
livelihood is (and how resistant it may be to hazards). A person’s wellbeing and self-
protection are closely determined by the strength of their livelihood (illustrated in the 
diagram, Figure 1). In turn, the way that different livelihoods are arranged between 
different groups of people depends very much on the type of governance that operates. 
The governance framework of society influences how income and assets are distributed, 
and therefore the likely success of different people’s livelihoods. Likewise, 
social protection is strongly related to the type of governance in operation, including the 
way that civil society operates. For instance, in some countries the opportunities for 
NGOs and other organizations to fill in the gaps in self protection are greater than in 
others. But in others it is even dangerous for NGOs to press for the government to fulfil 
its normal duties to the people. 
Figure 1  
Five components of vulnerability and their main determinants 
9 1 Livelihood - Strength and Resilience
2 Well-being – base line status, nutrition status, physical & 
mental health
3 Self-protection – income and resources used to protect 
against known hazards
4 Social protection – substitutes for self-protection when people 
are unable or unwilling to do it themselves
5 Governance:
determines quality of social protection AND the allocation of assets
Key connect/Disconnect 1 - income and subsistence provision
Key connect 2 - Spending & resource availability
Key disconnect 2
Bad governance leads to poor 
social protection
Key disconnect 3
Unequal income and asset 
distribution
Key disconnect 1 – Household assessment of risk
depends on culture and non-hazard priorities
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3.1  Livelihood, its strength and its resilience to hazards  
Livelihoods enable people to subsist: on the food they grow themselves, or earnings that 
are used to provide necessities and hopefully something more. Each livelihood activity 
requires a person to possess or have access to a range of assets (sometimes called 
‘capitals’) such as farm land, a skill, tools, livestock, etc.4 Those who do not have their 
own livelihood (e.g., children, many women, the elderly, the disabled and sick) are 
either dependent on other household members, or on welfare or charity (from the state 
or some other organization). In other words, these groups are often entirely or mainly 
dependent on a type of social protection provided by their kin or some wider grouping. 
A livelihood can involve many types of income-generating activities, ranging from 
begging to business, from farming to factory worker, from prostitution to servant. In 
towns and cities, most people depend on being employed or having some activity in the 
informal sector. The majority of urban dwellers have few tangible assets, and they rely 
on earning cash by depending on their skills or networks. In rural areas of developing 
and transition countries (still the majority of the world’s population), most people tend 
to be more dependent on being able to grow food—on their own or rented land. This is 
often combined with selling some crops or having an extra income-generating activity 
that provides essential cash. Most people strive to achieve sources of income that 
provide them with more than the minimum for subsistence, but as we know from the 
continued high levels of poverty in the world, many millions do not succeed. 
People’s livelihoods are their first ‘line of defence’ against disasters: it is the basis for 
their nutrition, their baseline status and their general health and welfare. It also 
determines the educational level they are able to secure for their children (who will 
eventually ‘inherit’ this as an intangible asset in their own livelihood pattern). In 
relation to hazards, the livelihood is also the basis for their capacity to protect 
themselves or not—self-protection is largely determined by the level of income 
available to a household to construct the right type of home in a safe location. 
Livelihoods clearly have different ‘strengths’ in themselves—they bring about higher or 
lower returns, usually dependent on the amount and quality of assets available to the 
person. But in relation to hazards we are also interested in how resilient they are. For 
example, is the livelihood resistant to the impact of an earthquake, or will the assets be 
damaged? In Gujarat (India) three years after the 2001 earthquake, many people 
consider that ‘they are still ten years away from getting their life back on track’. But one 
group of very poor craftswomen have found a way to make their lives better even than 
before the disaster. The key to this success has been their membership of a union 
supported by the Self-Employed Women’s Association. This has enabled the women 
embroiderers to get raw materials, tarpaulin covers for working under, and also the 
opportunity to rebuild safer houses (with roofs that collect rainwater, too) (Gidley 
2004). Their livelihood has been restored but to a better condition than before. 
Disaster preparedness needs to be about strengthening and protecting livelihoods: 
resilience needs to be built into the system. This is not easy, for as we shall see later 
access to assets and the strengths of different livelihoods are largely dependent on wider 
                                                 
4   The links between livelihoods, assets and disaster vulnerability is covered in depth in what we call the 
access model in Wisner et al. (2004: chapter 3). 5 
political factors. On the other hand, some remedies can be relatively easy. For instance, 
people in Vietnam who lose crucial documents (such as wedding certificate, education 
certificates, and proof of house ownership) in floods are disadvantaged in their access to 
relief and to new job opportunities. The Vietnamese Red Cross has been able to provide 
waterproof plastic containers to help solve this problem.5 
The main determinants of a livelihood are then: 
–  amount and quality of assets (capitals) owned or accessible to the person, 
especially to enable productive and income-generating and/or self-provisioning 
(subsistence farming) activities 
–  access to employment activities or other income-generating opportunities when 
lacking productive assets 
There is a very strong linkage of livelihoods with governance. The type and quality of 
assets available to each person is influenced by the way that wealth and income is 
distributed between different groups of people, and this is affected by power relations. 
An obvious case is that of land distribution, which is unequal in many developing 
countries. Without access to enough land for a farming livelihood, people are forced to 
find other income-generating activities. Likewise, the progressiveness (or otherwise) of 
taxation and welfare redistribution are largely a function of the type of government. 
Vulnerability has increased greatly in the countries of the ex-Soviet Union because of 
the withdrawal of many pensions, welfare payments, health and social services. 
Problems may be more intractable when governments themselves are a party to the 
power relations that have led to the inequalities of wealth. We therefore expect there to 
be a high degree of correlation between inequality of wealth and vulnerability to 
hazards: if inequality is high, there will be more poor people with weaker and less 
resilient livelihoods. It is also generally the case that governments that tolerate high 
levels of inequality pay less attention to the needs of the poor and vulnerable.  
3.2  Wellbeing and base-line status  
This component of vulnerability is derived mainly from the strength of a person’s 
livelihood—the amount of income or subsistence that is available from the activities 
that make up the livelihood. This affects the quality and quantity of an individual’s diet 
(and that of their dependents), and whether he can afford adequate health care. In 
addition to nutritional status, it involves physical and mental health, his morale, and the 
level of stress and his sense of security and identity in his household and locality. 
People with poor nutrition are generally less resistant to disease, and less capable of 
making a good recovery when further stressed by a hazard impact. 
Morale and personal resilience, stress and general mental health are all factors that are 
likely to affect the ability to resist the impact of a hazard. Morale and stress need to 
receive far more attention than they do. For instance, high levels of baseline stress in 
China result in a quarter of a million suicide deaths each year, two-thirds of these by 
young women. In rural areas, suicide is the third most common cause of death in 
                                                 
5   This is not just a problem of floods: many people whose homes were devastated in Bhuj lost their 
documents and this made it difficult for them to claim compensation (Gidley 2004). 6 
women.6 It is not difficult to guess the potential for disasters to make this worse. 
Another issue that is now receiving more attention is the impact of AIDS on wellbeing, 
and the creation of new types of dependents who require nursing and expensive drugs 
when previously they have often been the main breadwinners in a household. AIDS is 
both a hazard and disaster in its own right, but also a cause of further vulnerability in the 
way it undermines people’s livelihoods and baseline status. It is also a major factor in 
reducing morale and increasing stress for both the sufferers and their families. 
The contributing factors in wellbeing are then: (i) nutritional status; (ii) physical health; 
(iii) mental health, and (iv) security and identity. These are mainly determined by:   
(i) the strength of the livelihood, and (ii) security and freedom from stress—linked 
largely also to governance. 
What are the connections here with community? For the most part, people’s wellbeing 
is not something that is necessarily improved by being part of a community: it is rather a 
consequence of their livelihoods, and these can be very unequal within what might be 
called a community. A community can also be a place where some people experience 
stress and even conflict. The most valuable impact on the wellbeing of people in a place 
is likely to be the outside interventions that bring health care, vaccination, and feeding 
supplements—from the wider community that is not connected with place. 
3.3 Self-protection 
Being able to acquire adequate self-protection from a hazard depends on people’s 
capability (and willingness) to build a home that is safe from the prevalent hazards, and 
the ability to site the house somewhere out of harm’s way, e.g., from floods or 
landslides. Whether or not someone is able to build a house that is wind or earthquake 
resistant is largely determined by their income. Of course they must also want to build 
safely, and have the knowledge and skills available to achieve proper construction when 
they do have adequate resources. If knowledge or skills are missing locally, more social 
protection is needed to fill this gap.  
Outsiders are sometimes frustrated by people’s apparent unwillingness to take adequate 
precautions for protecting themselves. This shows up the different priorities and 
attitudes to risk. An NGO working in a Caribbean island, or even the government itself, 
may look at the apparent high risk of being struck by a hurricane, and find it difficult to 
understand when the people do not quickly respond to the encouragement to put in roof 
reinforcements. But sometimes people are just prepared to take the risk: why spend 
money on a roof that will be proof against hurricane winds that may never happen, 
when each and every day the household has to cope with an inconvenient and unhealthy 
kitchen? When faced with this dilemma in a programme to make roofs wind-proof in a 
Caribbean island, the Red Cross society decided to help people to improve both. 
But of course ideally self-protection should be the goal, though many people are 
vulnerable precisely because they do not have the livelihood that can ‘buy’ adequate 
security. A major reason that people suffer in floods in Bangladesh is because their 
homestead is not build above the level of what are regarded as normal floods, and it is 
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too expensive for them to achieve this. In Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), the many thousands 
who endure flash floods and house collapse in the favelas (slums) on steep slopes in the 
city are prevented from constructing their homes in safe places by the high land prices. 
So the main determinants of self-protection are: (i) sufficient income; (ii) availability of 
suitable materials, technical knowledge, and construction skills, and (iii) willingness to 
take the necessary steps. These are mainly dependent on: adequate livelihood to provide 
the finances and motivation. 
The linkages of these factors with community are not so strong. Community may play 
some role in providing the networks of skills and knowledge that can facilitate self-
protection, but in most situations self-protection is likely to be a very individual process. 
Where it is inadequate—through lack of income or motivation—the role of social 
protection is crucial. 
3.4 Social  protection   
Sometimes the type of protection people need against a hazard cannot be done by the 
individual or the household. It involves perhaps the regulation of land use or the 
construction industry, to ensure that residences are built away from flood plains or that 
their structure is resistant to earthquakes. These are functions that must be carried out by 
society, and if they are not done properly the results can be catastrophic. In the 1999 
earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan, tens of thousands of people died because of the 
collapse of buildings where construction firms had not followed the seismic codes, and 
where inspection was inadequate or corrupt.  
In other situations, the precautions for disaster preparedness are simply not feasible at 
the individual or household level, and so the only way to do it is through the wider 
society (which may include the community). The large concrete shelters built in 
Bangladesh as refuges from cyclones are only possible on a large scale. They require a 
sizeable investment that needs help from an outside organization, and some support was 
provided by the Bangladesh Red Crescent and German Red Cross.  
Social protection, therefore, involves forms of hazard preparedness provided by levels 
of society above that of the individual or household. And sometimes social protection is 
needed when individuals are just too poor to do it for themselves. It is either a substitute 
for self-protection (i.e., a function that should be performed by government when 
people are too poor or not motivated to provide protection for themselves) or it involves 
precautionary or preventive measures that can only be provided by a higher-level 
institution because of the cost or scale of operation required. 
Social protection is also imperative for specific groups of people that may not have their 
own livelihood, or cannot acquire adequate self-protection within their households. For 
example, the elderly are particularly at risk in heatwaves like those in 2003 that affected 
India (where temperatures reached 50 degrees Celsius) and parts of Europe, where it is 
estimated as many as 35,000 people died (New Scientist 2003a). Clearly, where 
children, the elderly, the sick cannot or do not receive adequate hazard protection from 
their own families and households, there is a need for other social groupings to step into 
the gap. These might range from government through to local religious groups, or 
national and international organizations and NGOs, including the Red Cross/Red 8 
Crescent movement. These stereotypical vulnerable groups require special attention to 
ensure that they are properly socially-protected, in case they are unable to rely on a 
household for support. 
The main factors involved in social protection are: 
–  adequate revenues for the local or national government to do what is needed; 
–  political will at local and national government level; this provides the motivation 
to implement building codes, mitigation measures, protection of schools and 
infrastructure, etc., and 
–  availability of relevant technical knowledge and ability to implement. 
These are mainly determined by the type of governance in operation: the efficiency of 
planning and building regulation, the level of corruption, whether or not NGOs and civil 
society groups can operate to promote disaster preparedness, reduce vulnerability and 
provide assistance. 
It would seem that community ought to be highly relevant to social protection: in many 
cases it would be the logical place for its implementation. But different people play 
different roles in a community that may show that there is no guarantee of benevolence 
in their behaviour. For instance, in the 1999 Turkish earthquake, some of the contractors 
who put up the substandard buildings that collapsed and killed the majority of the 
people, and the local officials who were supposed to enforce the codes, must have been 
members of the community. Social protection needs to be based on much more solid 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of community. 
3.5 Governance 
Are there still any problems where a dose of good governance is not prescribed to make 
them better? For more than ten years the World Bank and other development agencies 
have promoted governance as a key factor that needs to be addressed in trying to 
improve people’s lives in regard to a wide range of issues, often through conditionality 
attached to aid. So how can it help in disaster preparedness? We need to be quite 
specific about what the links are between governance and disaster vulnerability, and 
show what elements of vulnerability and resilience can be improved by better 
governance. Governance has been defined as ‘the arena in which everyone… negotiates 
for their share of space, resources, and entitlement to fulfil their needs and develop their 
interests. It is about who gets to make or influence decisions, how those decisions are 
made, and for the benefit of whom’ (World Disasters Report 2004: chapter 1). 
Clearly this also means that governance affects the distribution of risk—the allocation 
of different levels of vulnerability among groups of people. Governance has also been 
defined by the World Bank as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World 
Bank 1992). This means that it involves not only formal government but also the other 
systems of power, some of which are possibly more significant than the government 
itself. The keyword is power. But those who use the term governance often seem 
reluctance to accept that bad governance is a consequence of those who enjoy the 
benefits of power wanting to keep it that way. The issues are often discussed as if there 9 
is a rationalist and neutral way of improving governance that is not going to disturb 
those who benefit from the status quo. 
Governance is about much more than government, and involves power in the much 
broader sense in which it is exercised by all actors and stakeholders, including the 
private sector, civil society and international organizations. Improving governance may 
mean changing the behaviour of the already-powerful so that their activities do not 
enhance vulnerability—for instance companies that engage in logging that provokes 
landslides and flooding. It also means enabling ordinary, less powerful people to affect 
the priorities of government (e.g., in disaster preparedness), perhaps through self-
organization (e.g., community-based organizations), freedom of association, and 
generally having a voice.  
This wider ‘power system’ also affects people’s capacity to take precautions against 
hazards, their rights to express their needs, and to have access to the relevant technical 
knowledge and preparedness measures and therefore reduce their vulnerability. This 
becomes very evident in the World Disasters Report 2004 chapters on ‘The 
Urbanization of Risk’ and on ‘Heatwaves’, both of which discuss the problems of 
inadequate or bad governance in making vulnerability worse. In the slums of Mumbai 
(Bombay), ‘illegal’ slum dwellers may be afraid to make their homes more flood-proof 
for fear that the authorities will evict them and their investment lost. In some countries it 
is even difficult to campaign against corruption and inefficiency. For instance, in China 
medical staff were afraid to expose the official cover-up of the SARS epidemic in 2003, 
though eventually there was sufficient pressure that the minister of health and mayor of 
Beijing were removed from their posts (New Scientist 2003b). 
If there is a relationship between bad governance and high levels of vulnerability, then it 
is essential to include governance as a component of vulnerability. This factor has been 
discussed in terms of democracy and freedom of the press in relation to famines by 
Amartya Sen (Nobel Prize winner in economics) and Jean Drèze (Drèze and Sen 1989). 
In countries where the press is relatively free, they consider that famine has been largely 
avoided because of the potential for the press to draw attention to the problem. By 
contrast, some of the worst famines in the twentieth century occurred in totalitarian 
states where information was suppressed, as in China (1958-62), Ethiopia (1974), and 
currently in North Korea. No better demonstration of the relevance of governance to 
disaster vulnerability is needed, both in its effects on livelihoods and on social 
protection. 
4  Resilience and vulnerability 
The concept of resilience is similar in some ways to the idea of capacity. It reflects both 
the fact that people (some people?) can show an amazing capability to bounce back after 
a hazard has struck, and also that their ‘non-victimhood’ deserves to be acknowledged. 
Resilience involves the ability of systems to restart quickly after a hazard has struck, 
and to ‘adapt existing resources and skills to new systems and operating conditions’ 
(Comfort, quoted in Davis 2004). Pelling defines it as: 
the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard stress. It is a 
product of the degree of planned preparation undertaken in the light of a 10 
potential hazard, and of spontaneous or premeditated adjustments made 
in response to felt hazard, including relief and rescue (Pelling 2003: 48). 
This suggests that it involves people’s conditions before a hazard strikes, as well as their 
ability to respond and recover afterwards. In other words, like vulnerability it has a 
predictive aspect: it should be possible—on the basis of the characteristics of a group of 
people who are exposed to a particular hazard—to identify their capacity for resilience. 
In fact, if people have a high level of resilience, they will not be so vulnerable. The two 
concepts can by and large be seen as the two ends of a spectrum. High levels of 
vulnerability imply a low resilience, and vice versa. If we now relate the idea of 
resilience to the five components of vulnerability outlined above, we can identify the 
ways that vulnerability can be reduced by increasing resilience. The pattern of highs and 
lows in the different components of vulnerability and resilience will vary between 
individuals, households, groups, communities and so on. 
So we find that: 
–  A strong and resilient livelihood means that a person’s income-generating 
activities are sufficiently robust and adaptive in the face of a hazard; 
–  Wellbeing and base-line status: greater resilience is possible when people are 
facing a disaster with more robust health and good nutrition. They are likely to 
resist illness and have better morale to cope with the aftermath of a hazard; 
–  Self-protection: high levels of self-protection will enable people to guard their 
assets and homes, reduce mortality and injury, and not have to spend time 
working to replace key possessions or rebuild homes; if adequate self-protection 
has not been possible, then social protection should be filling the gap; 
–  Social protection, when properly in place, will mean again that people can more 
quickly become operational after a hazard strike, restoring their livelihoods, 
making good the damage, and providing the resources needed for relief and 
recovery; 
–  Governance that works well should be improving livelihoods and the 
effectiveness of social protection. But the institutions involved in governance 
must themselves be resilient—capable of remaining in operation to fulfil their 
relevant tasks in relief, recovery and the incorporation of measures that reduce 
future vulnerability as well. 
This all seems very straightforward, especially at the household level. But it becomes 
more difficult when we consider wider aspects of society, and community. For example, 
if some people in a community have a ‘strong’ livelihood (and are wealthy) is this a 
‘resilience factor’ for them, or a partial cause of the weaker livelihoods of others? And 
is being part of a particular network a capacity, or a denial of capacity to others (as with 
castes in India)? In other words, we need to acknowledge that within communities, 
resilience varies according to opportunities that are distributed unequally. But this is 
difficult, because many governments are reluctant to deal with inequality and 
inadequacies in people’s livelihoods. Development and disaster preparedness agencies 
find it difficult to challenge this directly. 
Dealing with resilience then tends to focus on three areas of potential support that 
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infrastructure, community assets (e.g., schools, clinics), and sometimes livelihoods. The 
objective is to: 
–  increase the capacity to absorb or withstand abnormal pressures or stresses—a 
risk reduction function; 
–  achieve the ability to cope with hazard impacts and quickly restore activities 
without significant damage—an emergency management function; 
–  promote adaptive behaviour and the ability to make adjustments to any new 
circumstances that may apply after a hazard impact—mitigation, emergency 
management and recovery function (adapted from Davis 2004). 
Policy for promoting resilience is then an arena where vulnerability is reduced through a 
focus not so much on each component of individual or household vulnerability, but 
rather on the aspects that can actually be more directly affected by action taken by 
community-based organizations and outside agencies. It is akin to finding the aspects of 
resilience that can be dealt with as an ‘aggregated’ system rather than dealing with the 
varying degrees of vulnerability across the entire five components. 
5  Communities and resilience 
What does a community feel like, what does it involve, and does everybody belong to 
one? And how is it different from just yourself or your household? These seem rather 
important questions in disaster preparedness and recovery. The idea of community is 
frequently used as if it is the ‘level’ where, as a bare minimum, consultation should take 
place, where participatory activities are conducted, and disaster preparedness should be 
carried out. This is because we tend to take it for granted that a community is a good 
thing: it evokes a sense of collaboration and harmony, an assumed coherence, usually 
associated with a place or location, often a village or an urban neighbourhood (which 
itself embodies an assumption of ‘neighbourliness’).  
This ‘place’ or location is supposedly the reason that there is a community—it is 
assumed that a group of people who share this place by living and working there 
together are somehow connected with each other in a more meaningful way than they 
are with others. It is this benign and supposedly beneficial aspect of community that 
outsiders want to tap into: these are qualities that, outsiders hope, exist in a place to 
promote disaster preparedness. A typical sign of this is evident in a report from the 
UNDP India office:  
There is a growing realization that many top down approaches to disaster 
management fail to address the specific local needs of the vulnerable 
communities, as it does not take into account the potential of local 
resources and capacities. The community being the first to confront and 
respond immediately in the exigency of any emergency, there is a need 
to build up the capacities of the communities, enhance the skills and 
traditional coping mechanisms for minimizing losses resulting from 
disasters (GoI 2003). 
But how valid is this notion of community as a caring, moral and cooperative group of 
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that such communities exist and is the ‘place’ or ‘group’ of people where something 
should be done? At times it seems that it can work extremely well, as in the case of 
flood preparedness carried out in a highly sophisticated way by the people living on an 
island in the River Nile in Khartoum, Sudan (World Disasters Report 2004: chapter 1). 
There are many examples in the literature of the success of disaster preparedness when 
organized on a community basis, as for example in India and the Philippines. But even 
in these examples, we find a rather constrained idea of community: it becomes defined 
in terms of those people who will cooperate with each other, and does not necessarily 
include everybody in a particular location. One disaster preparedness project in 
Cambodia found considerable difficulties in dealing with the internal tensions within 
community. As the project leader says: 
The more powerful in society may not want the most vulnerable to 
participate. Therefore changing this may require advocacy by the NGO 
which is not really compatible with a participatory research 
methodology, or by-passing the more powerful in society which is not 
sustainable once the NGO has left. Doing this may actually endanger the 
most vulnerable, putting them at risk of reprisals (Williams 2003: 22). 
We need to be realistic, or disaster preparedness may not work. There is a lot of 
evidence that people who live in what are assumed to be communities do not always 
behave favourably towards others. In the past ten years we have seen the most appalling 
examples of the disintegration of communities in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. In 
sociology the problem has been known for many years. A recent survey of the concept 
shows the concerns: 
An oft-repeated message of the community studies literature is that 
communities are not very community-like. They are as rife with interest, 
power, and divisions as any market, corporation, or city government 
(Brint 2001: 6). 
He reports on sociology studies from more than fifty years ago that show ‘the 
comforting image of community-centred governance’ was acknowledged to be an 
illusion, and instead that supposed communities had ‘a self-interested and self-
reproducing power structure ruling from behind the scenes’ (ibid.: 6). Yet half a century 
later, we find that policies for decentralization and local governance in developing 
countries are a cornerstone of World Bank and UNDP policies, pushing an idealized 
notion of locality and community to the forefront of policy.7 Alongside this, the idea of 
community in disaster work enjoys unprecedented legitimacy today. 
Communities are places where normal everyday inequality, exploitation, oppression and 
maliciousness are woven into the fabric of relationships. These are then scaled-up from 
this micro-level to become part of the national social and economic problems. For 
example, half the people in any community are female: can it really be called a 
community when the gender divide itself is so significant in much of the world? Just 
                                                 
7   The sociology studies of community invoked by Brint are mainly concerned with developed 
economies, but I am convinced that readers who are familiar with most other parts of the world will 
recognize this analysis are being relevant to developing and transition countries the world over. What 
seems extraordinary is the uncritical faith in the community that seems to have arisen, which seems to 
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because it happens at the grassroots, the daily grind of oppression and inequality is just 
as harsh. A community may function in relative harmony for much of the time, but the 
apparent cohesion and collaboration is a false impression based on the necessity of 
those who have less power to work with and for those who have more power.  
On a visit to Tamil Nadu (south India) I went with a friend to his home village. There I 
was introduced to the headman, who proudly showed me round the temple he was 
constructing to earn religious merit on this earth. While the headman shook my hand in 
welcome, my friend explained that he was actually the largest landowner, and that a few 
years before some of the agricultural labourers in the village had demanded better 
wages. This man had arranged for the two ringleaders to be killed as a lesson to them 
all. We could find similar stories in many communities around the world. Another 
extreme example of this dilemma comes from Cambodia, where an international NGO 
found it difficult to get some villagers to accept the need to help the most vulnerable 
people. The other villagers’ attitude was that they were suffering because of their 
reincarnated status: they were being punished for what they had done in a previous 
existence, and so it would be wrong to intervene on their behalf (Williams 2003). 
In the place we want to call a community, some have better opportunities than others, 
some are richer than others, and some are safer than others. In the flood-prone north 
Indian villages I have visited, the outcaste untouchables (now often referred to as Dalits) 
live in squalid, flood-prone settlements on the low-lying edges of villages, while the 
better-off have homes that are on raised land at the centre. Red Cross workers in a 
village in the Philippines found that the school was at the bottom of a hill and was 
frequently flooded, while the mayor lived on dry land at the top. Fortunately the 
presence of outsiders embarrassed him enough to allow the school to be relocated on 
safer land that he owned. So to understand vulnerability is to understand community not 
as a harmonious place with the potential for mutuality and risk sharing, but a place of 
unequally distributed risks and vulnerabilities.  
What we have to establish for DP is what may be positive and helpful about community, 
and what its limitations are. The crucial aspect that needs to be considered is the 
motivation—the set of incentives—which people may have to connect them with each 
other in a particular place, and how these can be utilized in the specific context of 
hazards and disaster preparedness. We need to: 
–  examine the components of vulnerability, and the relevance of community to 
each of those components and any allied process of building resilience; 
–  highlight the significance of community in disaster preparedness—before and 
after a hazard strikes; 
–  show that community has many meanings—from the neighbourhood, up to the 
international community—and each one has differing significance depending on 
the vulnerability faced; 
–  avoid the idealising the concept of community; 
–  show that community has real meaning in disaster preparedness only when it can 
properly compensate for the lack of individual vulnerability and can contribute to 
resilience for the benefit of the most vulnerable; 14 
–  show that these areas of benefit are mainly concerned with governance, social 
protection, and the protection and strengthening of livelihoods; and  
–  show where disaster preparedness policies can be a crucial component of 
community-based disaster prevention. 
6  What role for community in disaster preparedness? 
The lessons are then that we must not idealize communities—they may be able to 
cohere and enable collaboration for some purposes but not others. And sometimes the 
way they produce collaboration may be possible only under the ‘moral influence’ or 
with the additional incentives provided by outsiders. This suggests that the ‘internal 
imperfections’ of community can be compensated by external influences. A non-
disaster example of this is the significant progress that has been made in women’s rights 
in many countries around the world in societies and communities where internal 
pressure for such changes would be taking a lot longer to produce results. Sometimes 
external support provides legitimacy for existing but suppressed views that exist 
unvoiced within the community. But equally, having enabled those voices to be heard, 
what happens after the outside agency leaves the scene? Have new dangers—of 
recrimination, envy, or hurt pride—been instigated for the vulnerable to face 
afterwards? 
The issue of motives to encourage collaboration is also crucial: as with all aspects of 
human behaviour, people respond to incentives. In what types of situations in DP is it 
legitimate for outsiders to provide the shift in motivation—the encouragement of 
changed behaviour—by the provision of additional or different incentives? It is doubtful 
that people within a community can be expected to respond purely and simply to non-
material ‘feel good’ incentives—even if they imply future disaster reduction. We need 
to understand what will motivate people to collaborate in vulnerability reduction. The 
best option here may be to encourage community involvement in social protection 
measures that fill the gaps in self-protection, and that strengthen and protect livelihoods 
of all members of the community. This is the basic idea behind the concept of disaster 
resistant communities that originated in the USA, where existing business interests and 
patterns of assets and livelihoods are left untouched, but a form of collaboration by all is 
fostered through the catalyst of disaster preparedness advice, and mitigation incentives.8 
A key component of the idea is that livelihoods are protected and the normal pattern of 
economic activities is made resilient to expected hazards.  
However, in many poor countries, this continuation of the existing economy is likely to 
perpetuate precisely the conditions that generate vulnerability in the first place. 
Communities may involve areas of common interest in some activities; but the 
community is also the basis for competition, not collaboration. Disaster preparedness 
has to recognize that communities do not necessarily allow for the best conditions for 
reducing vulnerability. Sometimes it takes the wider community of outsiders to shake 
up the aspects of community that are preventing the reduction of vulnerabilities. This is 
                                                 
8   An introduction to the concept and how to promote disaster resistant communities is given in Geis 
(2000: 151-60).  15 
confirmed by the experience of the ‘capacity building for climate change’ project in 
Vietnam, where the project leader has reported: 
It was realized that the effective and successful disaster reduction 
initiatives are often attributed to the spontaneous participation of the 
communities and involvement of the people in Vietnam. However, in 
most cases, it can be observed that the community initiatives produce 
results so long as there is external support from the NGOs and 
international organizations (Khan 2004). 
Working at the community level in particular places may make it possible for a meeting 
of minds, objectives and programmes when an outside organization wants to encourage 
change. For programmes that are meant to be for the benefit of people at the grassroots, 
communities may be the essential basic level for understanding how those changes can 
be planned and implemented. But community work like this may only be possible in 
situations where poor and less powerful people feel strong and safe from reprisal. It is 
interesting that much of the advance made in community-level work has been in areas 
where local empowerment has taken root, e.g., in the Philippines, Bangladesh, parts of 
India, South Africa and parts of Latin America.  
A CARE flood proofing project in Bangladesh may provide evidence for this potential. 
Running from 1999 to 2004, it is a: 
Community-based approach and strategy, and includes a wide range of 
components like: community mobilization and awareness, household 
flood proofing measures, small-scale agriculture, social forestation, 
infrastructure and community resource management, and income and 
livelihood protection. 
The results seem to have been very positive: 
The project has changed significantly the livelihood of char [island] 
people. In recent discussion sessions, the communities spontaneously 
identified the difference that occurred due to the project interventions… 
[in one village] for example, people from the mainland now express 
interest in marrying with people living on char lands (Islam 2004). 
It is worth noting the inclusion of resource management and livelihood issues in the 
project, and the fact that what was intended as a disaster management project had the 
effect of connecting up with broader development issues, and improved the marriage 
prospects of the people!  
But there are lots of problems involved in working with communities. One of the most 
serious is also the most obvious. It is impossible for outside organizations to work in 
every community! This problem has two aspects. First, the sheer number of 
communities makes it impossible for organizations to be everywhere. Second, some 
issues can only be resolved at national or even the global level. The factors that will 
reduce vulnerability in the areas of livelihood strength and in governance are not 
capable of being resolved locally.  16 
7  Where do we go from here? 
When asked about their vulnerabilities and the dangers they face, people at the 
grassroots often surprise outsiders with their answers. This shows the mismatch between 
outsiders’ and the local people’s own perception of risk. The community is often more 
concerned about the hazards of everyday life rather than the random and infrequent 
chance of being struck by an earthquake or hurricane. But if we analyse vulnerability 
and resilience as outlined above, we find that a crucial component of it is the strength of 
people’s livelihoods. In other words, the people’s priorities in their everyday lives do 
join up with the narrower concern about the potential impact of hazards. 
So at community level—and with full awareness of the problems of using that 
concept—vulnerability and capacity assessments need to be carried out that examine 
each of the five components of vulnerability. These must then be cross-checked against 
the validity of the community idea in each place: 
–  Which groups or sections of the community experience greatest vulnerability on 
each of the five vulnerability components? 
–  How are the different aspects of vulnerability and resilience distributed among 
the various groups? 
–  Are any aspects of vulnerability and resilience for one group being made worse 
by the behaviour of another group within the community? 
–  What are the prospects for collaboration between groups in overcoming these 
problems, given that they have not been adequately tackled so far? 
–  Are some people or groups likely to benefit more from any policy interventions 
than others, and if so what are the potential consequences of this? 
–  What role do outsiders have in being catalysts for any changes, and is their 
impact divisive or enhancing of cooperation, leading to a dependency culture, 
and likely to be permanent or only last as long as they are there? 
Where the local community may be inadequate to the task of reducing vulnerability, 
then other ways of building different types of wider community may be considered. For 
instance, where local community is not appropriate to the task of vulnerability 
reduction, we may need to think of community as something that extends much further 
afield, to include the national and international solidarity that is highlighted in the IFRC 
Strategy 2010: 6: ‘To improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of 
humanity’. If the only way to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience is for wider 
communities to act as a surrogate and support for the difficulties of local communities, 
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